The fiscal theory says that the price level is determined by the ratio of nominal debt to the present value of real primary surpluses. I analyze long-term debt and optimal policy in the fiscal theory. I find that the maturity structure of the debt matters. For example, it determines whether news of future deficits implies current inflation or future inflation. When long-term debt is present, the government can trade current inflation for future inflation by debt operations; this tradeoff is not present if the government rolls over short-term debt. The maturity structure of outstanding debt acts as a ''budget constraint'' determining which periods' price levels the government can affect by debt variation alone. In addition, debt policyᎏthe expected pattern of future state-contingent debt sales, repurchases and redemptionsᎏmatters crucially for the effects of a debt operation. I solve for optimal debt policies to minimize the variance of inflation. I find cases in which long-term debt helps to stabilize inflation. I also find that the optimal policy produces time series that are similar to U.S. surplus and debt time series. To understand the data, I must assume that debt policy offsets the inflationary impact of cyclical surplus shocks, rather than causing price level disturbances by policy-induced shocks. Shifting the objective from price level variance to inflation variance, the optimal policy produces much less volatile inflation at the cost of a unit root in the price level; this is consistent with the stabilization of U.S. inflation after the gold standard was abandoned.
1. INTRODUCTION THE FISCAL THEORY STATES that the price level is determined by the ratio of nominal debt to the present value of real primary surpluses, nominal debt Ž . 1 s present value of real surpluses. price level Ž . Ž . The fiscal theory is developed by Leeper 1991 , Sims 1994 , 1997 , Woodford Ž . Ž . 1995 , 1997 , 1998a , 1998b and Dupor 2000 with one-period debt, building on Ž . Ž . Sargent and Wallace 1981 . Cochrane 1999 reviews the fiscal theory, argues for its plausibility, and addresses many theoretical disputes.
In this paper, I extend the fiscal theory to include long-term debt. With Ž . long-term debt, the nominal value of the debt on the left-hand side of 1 is not fixed; it depends on nominal bond prices which in turn depend on expected future price levels. To see why this fact might matter, suppose that there is bad 1 I thank the CRSP, Graduate School of Business, and the National Science Foundation for research support, and I thank Andrea Eisfeldt for research assistance. I thank Angel Serrat, Michael Woodford, and an anonymous referee for unusually helpful comments. An early draft of this paper circulated under the title ''Maturity Matters: Long Term Debt in the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level. '' Ž . news about future surpluses so the right-hand side of 1 declines. If there is no long-term debt, the nominal value of government debt is predetermined, so the Ž . price level must rise to re-equilibrate 1 . However, if long-term bonds are outstanding, their relati¨e price and thus the numerator of the left-hand side might fall instead, leaving today's price level unchanged. Lower bond prices today correspond to expectations of higher price levels in the future, so long-term debt means that bad news about future surpluses can result in future rather than current inflation.
Ž . To analyze issues of this sort, I solve equations like 1 for the price level, with current and expected future surpluses and debt on the right-hand side. I present an exact solution, but it is algebraically complex. I also present two approximate solutions which are more convenient for many applications.
Comparati¨e Statics

Ž .
I use the solutions to understand the obvious comparative statics exercises: i How does the price level react to current and future surpluses, holding debt Ž . constant? ii How does the price level react to current and future debt, holding surpluses constant? Answers to the first question are particularly useful in thinking about events such as currency crashes or the ends of hyperinflations. Answers to the second question suggest ways in which government choices about the quantity and maturity structure of nominal debt can cause inflation or offset the inflationary impact of surplus shocks. They also allow us to think about open market operations, deliberate ''twists'' in the maturity structure, and other debt-management issues.
In answer to the first question, I find that the effects of surpluses on the price level depend on debt policy: Current and expectations of future state-contingent debt sales and redemptions matter as well as the maturity structure of outstanding debt. The effects are often surprisingly different than those in the short-term debt case. For example, if the government pays off outstanding perpetuities rather than roll over short-term debt, the price level at each date is determined by the surplus at that date rather than by the present value of surpluses.
In answer to the second question, I find that the effects of debt on the price level also depend on the maturity structure and on expectations of future debt policy. For example, I find that the government can trade inflation today for inflation in the future, with no change in surpluses, if and only if some long-term debt is outstanding. Suppose that the government sells some additional debt, holding surpluses constant. If no long-term debt is outstanding, the government faces a unit-elastic demand curve. Bonds are nominal claims to the same real resources, so bond prices fall one-for-one with the number sold; real revenue from bond sales and the price level today are unaffected by the number sold. However, if there are long-term bonds outstanding, selling extra debt dilutes the existing long-term bonds as claims to the fixed stream of future real resources. In this case, unexpected debt sales can raise revenue today and lower today's price level, with no change in current or future surpluses, or in the total market value of debt. Of course, selling more debt today with constant surpluses always raises the price level later, as fixed real resources must pay off a larger nominal debt.
This limited control of the timing of inflation is a different mechanism than Ž . that studied by Sargent and Wallace 1981 . In that paper, there is a monetary friction, debt is real, and the monetary authority determines when seignorage revenue will be earned. The mechanism works with short-term debt. Here, there is no monetary friction, debt is nominal, the treasury determines the price level path, all revenues are held fixed, and the mechanism only works if long-term debt is present.
For most of the comparative statics, state-contingent debt policyᎏwhen the debt is expected to be repurchased, redeemed or rolled overᎏis crucially important to the resulting price level and nominal interest rate path. Thus, questions such as ''what is the effect of an open market operation? '' or '' what is the effect of a change in the maturity structure'' cannot be answered without specifying the full date-and state-contingent change in debt policy, as well as any implicit changes in current and expected future surpluses. As always in dynamic intertemporal models, one must think about policy rules or statecontingent sequences, rather than think about decisions taken in isolation.
Optimal Policy
After studying the comparative statics of debt and surplus movements, I ask what debt and surplus policies optimally smooth inflation, paying particular attention to motivations for long-term debt. The three elements of the government's policy choice are the average maturity structure, the choice of statecontingent debt sales and redemptions in response to fiscal shocks, and a limited control of the surplus. I add each element in turn and analyze the results in terms of the above comparative statics.
I start by analyzing optimal fixed-debt policy, in which the government determines only the steady state level of debt and its maturity structure; it does not adjust debt in response to surplus shocks, and it cannot control the surplus. I find that short maturity structures are preferred when the present value of the surplus varies by less than the surplus itself; while long maturity structures are preferred when surpluses build up following a shock so that the present value varies by more than the surplus itself. This finding is a natural result of the comparative statics: the price level responds to the present value of surpluses with a short maturity structure, while the price level responds to the surplus at each date with a long maturity structure.
I then analyze optimal acti¨e policy, in which the government can also change the amount of debt and its maturity structure each period in response to surplus shocks. Now there is a second motivation for long-term debt. If long-term debt is outstanding, the government can smooth inflation by occasionally and unexpectedly devaluing long-term bonds, trading a lower price level today for a higher price level in the future. This action can smooth inflation after a shock has hit. I study a quantitative example in which the optimal fixed-debt policy consists of short-term debt, but the optimal active policy includes long-term debt so that the government can smooth inflation by such ex-post devaluations.
Finally, I add a limited control over the long-term surplus in order to model better the situation faced by the U.S. government and the fact that debt sales do seem to come with promises of increased long-run surpluses. This optimal policy Ž . analysis solves some empirical puzzles. A simpleminded application of 1 and its comparative-static predictions for the effects of surplus and debt shocks seems disastrous for the fiscal theory in U.S. data. However, if we regard the U.S. government as solving such an optimal policy problem, adapting debt and fiscal policy to defend price level stability in the face of cyclical surplus shocks rather than causing price level disturbances by exogenous surplus and debt movements, we can explain many of the initially puzzling features of the data.
Ž . For example, equation 1 suggests that the price level should move together with total nominal debt. On the reasonable assumption that the present value of the surplus is high when the surplus itself is high, it also suggests that the price level should move inversely with the surplus and that the real value of the debt should move together with the surplus. But none of these patterns is an even vaguely plausible description of U.S. data. Figure 1 presents the primary Federal surplusrconsumption ratio and CPI inflation.
2 If anything there is a slight positive correlation between surplus and inflation at business cycle frequencies. Figure 2 presents the surplusrconsumption ratio together with the level and FIGURE 1.ᎏFederal primary surplusrnondurable q services consumption, and CPI inflation. Both series are expressed as percentages.
2 For all the empirical work in this article, I use data from and presented in more detail in Ž . Cochrane 1999 . I constructed the value of the debt as the market value of all outstanding treasury securities, and inferred the surplus from the rate of return on government debt and the quantities outstanding. Dividing by consumption gives a more plausibly stationary series, and the theory adapts easily to this transformation by adding consumption growth to the ''rate of return'' in the formulas. FIGURE 2.ᎏReal value of the debtrconsumption; difference of real valuerconsumption, and surplusrconsumption ratio. All series are expressed as percentages. Vrc is shifted down by 45 percentage points to fit on the same graph. difference in total real value of the debt. Comparing the two figures, we can see that there is little correlation between the level of debt and the price level, inflation, or the surplus, as debt moves much more slowly than any of the other series. The surplus is nicely negati¨ely correlated with changes in debt. Unsur-Ž . prisingly with a constant price level, but surprisingly in terms of 1 , high surpluses pay down the debt.
By contrast, I find that the optimal policies that smooth inflation in the face of cyclical surplus shocks produce time series that are similar to these U.S. time series in many dimensions. For example, the optimal policies generate a negative correlation between surpluses and debt growth, as in the data.
A Few Comments on the Fiscal Theory
At heart, the fiscal theory recognizes that even apparently unbacked fiat money is, together with nominal debt, a residual claim on government surpluses, and values them as such. For example, stock is valued by number of shares Ž . 2 s present value of future earnings. price per share If Microsoft stock became numeraire, unit of account, and medium of exchange, we would try to understand price level determinationᎏthe rate of exchange between goods and one share of Microsoftᎏvia this equation. The fiscal theory Ž values government-issued nominal debt in exactly the same way. Cochrane Ž . . 2000 pursues the stock analogy in depth.
As this analogy makes clear, the fiscal theory needs no frictionsᎏno money demand or theory of moneyᎏto determine the price level. The fiscal theory can describe a well-determined price level for apparently unbacked fiat money in a completely cashless economy, one in which just-maturing government bonds are units of account but not media of exchange. The stock analogy also suggests that the fiscal theory's predictions for the price level will not be much affected by the presence of monetary frictionsᎏif some categories of debt help to facilitate transactions. The only potential effects are the small fiscal consequences of seignorage or interest rate spreads on transactions-facilitating assets. The analogy also shows that fiscal price level determination is immune to financial innovation and to private note issue. An agent can issue a claim to a share of stock, payable from his holdings, with no ''dilution'' effect on the value of the underlying shares, even if the agent's claim trades at a discount due to the risk that he may default. In the same way, agents can create and trade claims to government debt or banknotes with no effect on a fiscally-determined price level.
Ž . Ž . The basic fiscal theory equation 1 is, like the stock example equation 2 , an equilibrium valuation equation, not a constraint. There is nothing that forces Ž . Microsoft or Amazon.com! to adjust future earnings to match current valua-Ž . tions, any more than calling 1 a ''government budget constraint'' forces the government to raise future taxes in response to an ''off-equilibrium'' deflation. Since the equations apply just as well to an economy that uses Microsoft stock as numeraire and medium of exchange, the fiscal theory does not require that one assume anything different about government and private budget constraints.
Initially, the idea that nominal debt and surpluses are policy instruments may seem strange. Most of the above-cited fiscal theory analyses include a monetary Ž friction, and a monetary policy control of an interest rate or monetary aggre-. gate thus implicitly determines the evolution of nominal debt. With no monetary friction, however, nominal debt does become the nominal policy tool directly.
It is also unusual that nominal debt and surpluses are separate policy instruments. We are used to thinking of debt as evolving from a surplus decision. For example, with perfect foresight, the real value of one-period nominal debt B that matures at t evolves as Except for occasional currency reforms, changes in nominal debt with no change in surpluses are unfamiliar policy paths. Most extra sales of nominal debt increase the real value of total debt, and thus must come with an increase in expected future surpluses, since the total real value of debt always equals the Ž present value of future surpluses. A simultaneous decrease in the real discount . rate is theoretically possible, but unlikely in this context. Thus, our experience is largely composed of increases in debt that accompany a decreased current surplus and increased future surpluses, and, as we shall see, for good reasons: changes in debt with no accompanying change in surpluses have dramatic effects on the price level, and most governments do not want to cause sharp fluctuations in the price level. However, the fact that most policy actions consist of simultaneous changes in two levers should not cloud the fact that the two policy levers are nominal debt and real surpluses. We can analyze what happens if each is moved without moving the other, and then we can better understand why optimal policy typically consists of coincident movements in both levers.
Since the models here are frictionless, standard Modigliani-Miller theorems by which the maturity structure of the debt is irrelevant for real quantities still apply. I study the effects of the maturity structure on the nominal price level; such effects can occur even in a frictionless economy and desired nominal Ž . results such as smoothing inflation can determine optimal maturity structures.
The issues in this paper are different than those studied by most of the literature on the maturity structure of government debt. Lucas I model a frictionless economy in which no cash is held overnight. The economy need not be ''cashless;'' transactions may be facilitated by moneyᎏclaims to just-maturing government bondsᎏcreated each morning and retired each night via repurchase agreements rather than by direct exchange of maturing bonds, and any amount of private money, bonds, banknotes, checking accounts etc. may be created with no effect on the formulas that determine the price level. Ignoring monetary frictions simplifies the algebra a great deal without altering the first-order predictions of the fiscal theory. I assume a risk-neutral economy with constant gross real interest rate 1r␤; this assumption simplifies the formulas with no great loss of generality.
The entire analysis flows from two equivalent equilibrium conditions, derived below. The flow condition says that the real primary surplus s must equal bond t redemptions plus net repurchases,
while the present¨alue condition says that the real value of outstanding debt equals the present value of real surpluses, Ž . present value condition, 4 , specializes to a solution directly,
With one period debt, future surpluses affect the price level today. The price level today responds only to the present value of surpluses. While this case is familiar to fiscal-theory readers, it is not generally true that the present value condition is also a solution, as we see in the remaining cases.
No New Debt
Suppose instead that a full maturity structure is outstanding at time 0, and the government neither issues new debt nor repurchases outstanding debt before it matures. For example, the government could pay off a perpetuity. In this case,
Ž . tion 3 is now also a solution,
Now, prices are determined by bonds that fall due at each date divided by that date's surplus. Shocks to future deficits have no influence at all on the current price level. Instead, long-term bond prices, reflecting future inflation, entirely Ž . absorb the shocks to the present value of surpluses. To see this fact, apply 8 at t q j; a shock to expected s changes expected 1rp and thus changes bond
Since it is so much simpler, this maturity t t t t qj structure should prove more useful than rolled over short-term debt in many theoretical applications of the fiscal theory.
k-period Debt
As an intermediate example, suppose that each period the government issues Ž . B tq k k-period discount bonds each period, and then lets them mature. With
This is a k-period difference equation, with solution
The price level is still determined by a sort of present value, but only every kth term matters! For example, if the government issues 5 year debt, then Ž . expectations of surpluses in years 5, 10, 15, etc. matter to today's 0 price level, but surpluses in years 4, 6 etc. do not matter. As k ª 1 we recover the one Ž . period debt solution 7 in which all future deficits matter. As k ª ϱ, we recover Ž . the case 8 in which only today's surplus matters to today's price level.
Geometric Maturity Structure
A geometric pattern gives a tractable way to analyze a rich maturity structure.
Ž . Suppose that the amount of debt outstanding at the beginning of t end of t y 1 that will mature at t q j declines at a rate j :
Equivalently, the fraction of debt that matures at date t, sold at date t y j, follows a geometric pattern,
If the level of debt grows at a constant rate B t s , then this specifica-
tion also implies that debt declines geometrically with maturity at any given
tq j s B t . However, the latter conclusion is not the case
for arbitrary movements in debt over time. A specification in which debt always falls geometrically with maturity does not lead to a simple price solution, since the government must do a lot of buying and selling of debt at all maturities to maintain it. Ž . To derive a solution for this debt policy, plug 9 into the present value Ž . Ž . Ž . condition 4 , and plug 10 into the flow condition 3 . Adding the first and Ž . r 1 y times the second equations and solving for p we obtain the solution,
This example also nests the one-period debt case and the no-change-in-debt case as varies from 0 to 1.
SOLUTIONS
The above analysis gave some special cases of solutionsᎏprice on the left and other variables on the rightᎏbut leaves one hungry for more general solutions, that apply for arbitrary debt policies. Here, I present an exact solution, and then two approximate solutions that are convenient in some situations.
Exact Solution
To find a solution for prices in terms of debt and surplus, I start with either Ž . Ž . the flow 3 or present value 4 conditions and recursively substitute the same equations for future values of prices p . After some ugly algebra that I tqj relegate to the Appendix, the result can be expressed as
To define the W weights, first denote the fraction of maturity j debt issued at time t by
Then, the W are defined recursively by
To get some sense of what this means, write out the first two terms of the general solution,
The weights W capture the effects of debt policyᎏthe current and future t, j maturity structure of the debtᎏon the relation between the price level and the sequence of surpluses.
Approximate Solution with a Geometric Baseline
Ž . Future surpluses enter 12 simply, though with complex coefficients. Thus, we can easily characterize the effects of surpluses on the price level for special cases of debt policy. Debt enters in a more complex and nonlinear manner, as Ž . seen in 15 . Thus, to calculate the effects of debt policy on the price level, as well as for the optimal policy questions, I use an approximate solution which is much easier to manipulate. The approximate solution is based on a first-order Taylor expansion of the general solution about a simple baseline path. Ä U U Ž The approximate solution takes derivatives around a baseline path s , B t t t y1
. U 4 q j , p with geometrically growing surplus and a geometric maturity structure,
I denote by x the proportional deviation of each variable x from the baselinẽ t t path,
With this notation, two expressions for the approximate solution are convenient,
and, in lag operator notation, it is an aggregate of nominal, face values of the debt, not an aggregate of markeẗ alues of debt, since it is unaffected by variation in the price level and hence bond prices. The approximation uses the baseline price level to value outstanding debt rather than the actual price levels, and it uses the baseline maturity structure rather than the actual maturity structure to capture the trade-off between Ž . current and future price levels. It also linearizes the product B tq j rp . As 
Ž . Formula 22 will obviously lead to a convenient representation if the baseline path is geometric. To that end, I specify that the baseline path has a geometri-Ž . Ž . cally growing surplus, a geometric maturity structure as in 16 ᎐ 17 , and that the ratio of debt to price grows geometrically,
The baseline path must satisfy 4 , which restricts its parameters,
The first equation says that the real value of the debt must grow at the same rate as the surplus. The second equation says that the level of real debt must equal the level of the present value of future surpluses. With these restrictions, Ž . we have 18 .
The simplest such path features geometric growth in p and B t ,
However, the individual terms B t and p need not grow geometrically, so ty1 t long as their ratio does so. They may even be stochastic, and they may share a common unit root. The baseline path must satisfy ␦ F 1 to keep the present value of surpluses finite, and ␦ -1 to keep the present value of the debt finite. It is not necessary that F 1, but such maturity structures are unusual enough that we may want to impose F 1 in practice. First, with -1, the government sells some debt of every maturity each period, and then redeems it all when it matures. At s 1, the government sells or purchases no debt, simply redeeming a stock outstanding at the initial period. With 1 --1r␦, the government repurchases a little bit of every maturity debt each period, from an initially outstanding stock. To . y . To say the least, such a path requires fundamentally new institutions. The most likely implementation are consols that promise an increasing coupon. The limit s 1r␦ corresponds to the limit that the coupons grow at the nominal interest rate.
Second, 1 --1r␦ and debt and price level that grow over time imply that the face value increases with maturity, and therefore the total face value is infinite. At a minimum, this will pose a strain for current face-value based accounting practices. The market¨alue still declines with maturity, which is why such parameters are allowed. To see this, note that with geometric debt growth Ž . as in 24 , the face value of debt outstanding at each date is
while the market value of maturity j debt is
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Using the baseline path 16 ᎐ 18 , with parameters 23 , in 22 , and taking conditional expectations, we obtain a linearized present value condition
Ž . Since the weights are geometric, iterating 25 forward to solve for p is easy, t Ž . Ž . and gives the approximate price solution, 19 ᎐ 21 .
Approximate Solution with a Nongeometric Baseline Path
A linearization about a nongeometric baseline path captures some effects that are ignored by the linearization about a geometric path, but without the full complexity of the general solution. In this case, the coefficients in the linearization are similar to the general solution, and thus algebraically complex. However, these coefficients only need to be evaluated once, and the approximate solution is then a convenient linear function of surplus and debt policy.
Ž . Generalize 17 to an arbitrary baseline maturity structure,
Ž . The counterpart to 25 no longer has a geometric structure, so finding a solution requires more algebra. The solution, derived in the Appendix, is
Here,
are natural generalizations of their counterparts with a geometric maturity structure. The W are given by Ž . j then repurchased at time t, the price level rises by ␦ percentage points. Thus, the effect of increased debt on the price level is attenuated for longer term debt and as the maturity structure shortens.Ž . The second B term in 30 means that an increase in debt at date t, B , can t decrease the price level at time t, but only if some long-term debt is outstanding, i.e. if ) 0. If the government just rolls over short-term debt, this effect does not exist. New long-term debt dilutes outstanding long-term debt as a claim to fixed future resources. The more long-term debt is currently outstanding, the less the dilution, and hence the more revenue the government can raise for each dollar of extra long-term bond sales. In turn, the more real revenue raised, and used to redeem currently maturing bonds, the greater the impact on the price level.Õ nly the aggregates B enter this approximate solution, so analysis using the tã pproximate solution will not distinguish changes in the debt aggregate B ty1 brought about by changes in debt of different maturities. The approximation values changes in debt at the steady state price level, as any first-order approximation must. Thus, analysis using this approximation will be silent about the effects of state-contingent maturity rearrangements. Study of such policy will require a second-order approximation or the exact solution, and will not allow us to use simple linear time-series tools.
In most cases the government does not sell long-term debt and then repurchase it one period later. Rather, it sells additional long-term debt and then lets it mature. To calculate the effects of such a policy, suppose that at time 0 the government sells an additional 10 year bond and then lets that bond mature.˜˜2Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Normalizing to B 10 s 1, we have B 10 s 1r, B 10 s 1r , . . . , B 10 s achieved just as well by selling an additional one period bond and then rolling over that debt 10 periods before repaying it. All that matters to the price path is when the debt is expected to be repaid. The most important real-world debt operation is an open market operation. In this model, an open market operation is exactly the same thing as a debt sale or repurchase. For example, to repurchase a bond, the government issues additional just-maturing bonds, or equivalently, money. The comparative statics show that the effects of such an operation on the price level and hence nominal interest rates depend crucially on the maturity structure of outstanding debt, on Ž simultaneous surplus movements whether the government spends additional . cash , and on expectations of when and how the debt will be retiredᎏwhether by raising future surpluses, or by competing with debt that would be retired on a given day. A wide variety of results is possible by different specifications of these components of the policy change.
Similarly, a revenue-neutral shortening or lengthening of the maturity structure of the debt, as practiced by the Kennedy administration and discussed in Ž Ž . . the early Clinton years see Hall and Sargent 1997 will have effects on the price level and nominal interest rates that depend crucially on the pattern of expected repayments. If the government simply raises debt of maturity j and lowers that of maturity k, in a way that the aggregate B is unaffected t Ž . revenue-neutral at baseline prices , and then restores this pattern every period Ž as the debt matures i.e., sells some j y 1 maturity debt next period, buys some j . maturity debt, etc. then there is no effect whatsoever. However, if the government lets the twist mature, then the price level will rise when the j debt matures and decline when the k debt matures; this expectation will show up in interest rates at the moment of the initial twist.
Additional Effects with a Nongeometric Steady State
Ž .
The D coefficients in 27 measure the effect on the price path of an expected bond sale at date y1, which will be repurchased at date 0,
Note that D , D s 0. Thus, despite the fact that long-term debt may be y1 y2 . . .
sold, there is no effect on prices past period 0 when the debt is repurchased. all future expected debt changes. These terms all specialize to zero with thẽ geometric steady state, in which case the price level at t is only affected by B ty1 and B . To see the force of this effect, we need an example in which the t maturity structure is far from geometric. Suppose that the steady state maturity structure is s 1, s s иии s 0.5. The government combines some short-
term debt with some extremely long term debt, for example a perpetuity. Figure  4 plots the response of prices to an anticipated debt sale at time 0, which is then repurchased at time 1, for this case. All the interesting dynamics before time 0 would be absent with a geometric steady state.
Postponing InflationᎏThe Limits of Debt Policy
As we have seen, additional sales of long-term debt can lower the price level today while raising it in the future, when some long-term debt is outstanding, even with no change in surpluses. To what extent can the government affect the price level today through unexpected bond sales? For example, can it completely offset surplus shocks? Ž . The present value condition 4 answers these questions directly and exactly. Rewriting the condition slightly, Since debt was predetermined, the price level had to absorb any shocks to the Ž . present value of future surpluses. Now we have equation 31 . Debt of each Ž . maturity is still predetermined, so revisions in the expected inverse price level sequence must absorb any surplus shocks.
The government could attain a constant price level via debt policy alone if it issued state-contingent nominal debt. For example, suppose that the government issued state-contingent debt at time 0 and engaged in no further debt sales or Ž t . repurchases. Let B denote the amount of nominal debt that comes due at t Ž t . date t in state . Similarly, let s denote the real surplus at time t in state t . The budget identity at each date is then simply
In this case, the government can attain any stochastic process for prices, including a constant price level, by choosing the appropriate state-contingent debt structure. Though dynamic trading of long-term debt allows a greater array of state-contingencies than does short term debt, it does not attain this complete-markets or state-contingent limit. In this paper, I focus on non-state-contingent nominal debt because that is the nearly universal structure of nominal government debt.
OPTIMAL DEBT POLICY
We have seen that debt policy can affect the price level. Now, I search for policies that optimally smooth inflation. I proceed in three stages: First, I find an optimal fixed-debt policy, i.e. an optimal steady state maturity structure, given that the government does not adjust debt ex-post in response to shocks. Then, I allow the government also to pursue acti¨e debt policy, adjusting the level of debt of various maturities in order to offset surplus shocks. Finally, I allow the government to control part of the surplus as well.
We can anticipate some of the qualitative results. As we have seen, with fixed debt, shorter maturity structures relate today's price to many leads of the surplus, while long maturity structures relate today's price to fewer leads of the surplus. Therefore, a short maturity structure smooths inflation if surpluses have a large transitory component, while a long maturity structure will smooth inflation when surpluses build following a shock. Long maturity structures also make active debt policy possible, so that the government can smooth a surplus shock as it happens by selling more long-term debt. This fact weighs in favor of a long maturity structure, even when short-term debt is the optimal fixed-debt policy.
Statement of the Problem
Ä 4
Given a stochastic process for the surplus s , the government picks the t parameters governing the steady state maturity structure and a debt policỹ Ä Ž .4 B tq j to minimize the variance of inflation,
Ž . given that prices are generated by the approximate solution 19 . I state the objective and constraints in terms of steady states and deviations about the steady state, since I use the approximate price solution to solve the problems. In order to use the approximate solution, I constrain the government's choice to a geometric steady state. A natural constraint set for the steady state maturity structure is 0 -F 1. However, as discussed above, solutions with 1 --␦ y1 are possible though unusual given today's institutions. Thus, when the objectives point to high values of , I will study solutions limited by F 1 as well as Ž . solutions limited only by -1r␦. Debt B tq j must be in the time-t informat TŽ . tion set and must obey lim ␦ B s 0.
T ªϱ T
Smoothing the volatility of inflation is a reasonable characterization of postwar central bank objectives. In this model, the level of inflation is arbitrary and so it is not interesting to add it to the objective. Modeling ''inflation'' as the Ž . difference of proportional deviations from the steady state as in 32 rather than the ratio of price levels is an analytically convenient simplification. I also Ž . consider the objective of minimizing variance of the price level, min var p , t which is a plausible characterization of monetary policy objectives in the prewar, gold-standard regime. The methods adapt easily to other objectives. For exam- Figure 5 presents the optimal steady state maturity parameter as a function of the two roots and . The calculation is detailed in the Appendix. Ž . Ž every stationary AR 1 one root equal to zero, the other strictly less than one;
. this region is not shown in Figure 5 for clarity the optimal maturity is short, s 0. In these cases the variance of the present value of the surplus is smaller than the variance of the surplus, so short-term debt smooths inflation by making the price level equal to the smoother series. For the same reason, s 0 is Ž . optimal for two relatively small AR 2 roots, as can be seen in the lower left-hand corner of Figure 5 .
Two large positive roots produce hump-shaped impulse response functions that continue to rise after an initial shock, and for which the present value varies by more than the series itself. In this case, the longest possible maturity FIGURE 5.ᎏOptimal geometric maturity of passive debt policies that minimizes the variance of Ž . inflation, as a function of the two roots of the AR 2 surplus process. ␦ s 0.95. debt s 1r␦ minimizes the variance of the price le¨el. Long maturities are also useful in this case to minimize the variance of inflation, but as Figure 5 shows, the optimal maturity is interior 0 --1r␦, and interestingly is never much above s 1. This case is not implausible, as many macroeconomic time series have hump-shaped impulse-response patterns with roots roughly those of this region.
Acti¨e Debt Policy
Next, I allow the government to adjust debt of all maturities, still keeping the surplus process exogenous. As we have seen, this option gives another motivation for long-term debt, since state-contingent debt sales can postpone a shock to the price level if long-term debt is outstanding.
Ž 
is in the t y 1 information set, taking innovations of 33 yields a ty1 relation between the responses of price and surplus to shocks that does not involve debt,
Ä 4 Thus, I choose the weights to minimize the variance of the price level or j Ž . inflation rate subject to the constraint 34 . This operation is enough to fully characterize the optimal price process for given . Then, taking the variance of price level or inflation, I find the optimal maturity structure . Finally, I solvẽ Ž . 33 for debt B to characterize the debt policy that supports the optimal price ty1 process.
Minimize the Variance of the Price Le¨el
The objective is Ž . subject to 34 . A straightforward Lagrangian minimization gives the optimum price level process,
The minimum variance occurs with s 0, and the resulting optimal price level process is
The minimal-¨ariance price le¨el follows an i.i.d. process. Interestingly, this is true for any surplus process. Price variance is greater, the greater the response of Ž . the present value of the surplus to its shocks, measured by ␦ .
5
Ž .
Solving 33 for B , the debt policy supporting the optimal price process is
The debt process offsets all the time t present value of the surplus that is known as of t y 1. 
and hence the result.
Minimize Variance of Inflation
The algebra is a bit more complex in this case, so I present it in the Appendix. The objective is
Ä 4 j Ž . subject to 34 . For a given , the minimum-variance inflation process is
Ž . Now, for any surplus process, inflation follows an AR 1 . Notice that, in order to minimize the variance of inflation, the price le¨el becomes nonstationary. The active debt policy fundamentally transforms the price level process. With a fixed-debt policy, the price level would be stationary, following stationary fluctuations in the present value of surpluses. By making the price le¨el nonstationary, inflation can be smoothed.
The minimum variance of inflation for given is
This function declines monotonically in . Therefore, long-term debt lowers thë ariance of inflation, for any surplus process. The advantages of active debt policy are important. For example, we found that short-term debt minimized the Ž . variance of inflation with fixed-debt policies and an AR 1 surplus. Equation Ž . 37 shows that we get exactly the opposite conclusion with active debt policy. Long-term debt makes active debt policy possible, and the ability to offset shocks as they come by diluting and devaluing outstanding long-term debt dominates the fixed-debt inflation-smoothing properties of a short maturity structure.
Ž . The solution 35 that minimized the variance of the price le¨el gives much Ž . more volatile inflation than the solution 36 that minimizes the variance of inflation. Evaluating the variance of inflation from the minimized price level Ž . variance solution 35 , it is 2 2 2
The minimized variance of inflation given by 37 is lower by a factor 1 y ␦ . At s 1, ␦ s 0.95, for example, this means that the variance of inflation is only about 10 percent of what it would be under a policy that minimized the variance Ž . of the price level. On the other hand, the solution 36 that minimizes the variance of inflation gives a unit root and hence an infinite variance of the price level.
Ž . Ž . The contrast between 35 and 36 thus conforms broadly with experience: under a gold standard, the price le¨el was stationary, and inflation was quite volatile. Now, the variance of inflation is much lower, but the price le¨el wanders slowly and seems to have no long-run mean. Thus, the shift in the character of U.S. inflation from the prewar to the postwar period can be understood as a shift from a price-level targeting objective to an inflation smoothing objective subject to the constraints imposed by the fiscal theory of the price level.
Ž .
An AR 1 Example
To give a better sense of the optimal policies, I report calculations based on Ž . an AR 1 surplus
With s 1, the price level and debt policy that minimize inflation then simplify to Ž . Debt B depends on the whole history of surpluses despite the AR 1 surplus t structure. In order to produce a unit root in the price level, nominal debt policỹ Ž . B also has a unit root. The sign of the first term on the right-hand side of 39 ty1 is positive, so the government sells additional debt when there is a negative surplus shock. This action lowers the price level at the moment of the shock, but raises the price level in the future. The result is a smoother path of inflation at the cost of a more volatileᎏa unit root in factᎏprice le¨el. Since the approximate solution values changes in debt by the steady state bond prices, the solution does not prescribe which maturities should be changed in the active debt policy. Figure 6 presents artificial time series for debt growth, surplus and price level Ž . for this model. As in the data, but in contrast to an AR 1 surplus, fixed-debt model, there is no visible correlation between debt or the surplus and the price Ž . level and little correlation with inflation not shown for clarity . As in the data, nominal debt growth is negatively correlated with the surplus. However, the surplus is still positively correlated with the real value of the debt in this model, Ž . as it must be in any AR 1 surplus model. To match the fact in the data that both real and nominal debt growth are negatively correlated with the surplus, I consider policy that affects the surplus below.
To emphasize how important active debt policy is to this case, Figure 7 Ž . contrasts inflation from the optimal active policy with i the inflation that Ž . Ž . results from a fixed-debt policy with long term debt s 1 , and ii the inflation that results from the optimal fixed-debt policy, which uses short term debt Ž . s 0 . With either fixed-debt policy, the price level is perfectly positively Ž . FIGURE 6.ᎏArtificial data from optimal active debt policy with an AR 1 surplus. Parameters are s 0.6, ␦ s 0.95, s 1. correlated with the surplus, and so inflation is perfectly correlated with surplus growth. We see that active policy dramatically smooths inflation relative to the long-maturity fixed-debt policy, and also smooths inflation more than the optimal, short-maturity, fixed-debt policy.
The Limit ª 1r␦
Ž .
The variance of inflation in 37 continues to decline in all the way to the Ž . limit s 1r␦. Thus, as in Woodford 1998b , we find a motive for this technically possible but unusual maturity structure. As ª 1r␦, the market value of debt approaches a constant at all maturities, and hence the market value of debt at any maturity approaches zero. As a result, proportional deviations from this Ž steady state explode to infinity. Specifically, the limit of the debt policy derived Ž . FIGURE 7.ᎏArtificial inflation data from three debt policies with an AR 1 surplus. Parameters are s 0.6, ␦ s 0.95.
. in the Appendix as ª 1r␦ is
Finally, note that although the limit ª 1r␦ produces a zero variance of inflation, it does not produce a zero variance of the price level. The price level has a unit root, and thus infinite variance all the way to the limit. As above, s 0 minimizes the variance of the price level.
OPTIMAL SURPLUS AND DEBT POLICY
Last, I add a limited control over the surplus. Governments have at least some control over the surplus as well as nominal debt, and a realistic policy optimization exercise should recognize this fact. Most importantly, the vast majority of debt sales come together with an implicit or explicit promise to increase future surpluses.
Ž . Ž . A second and related issue is that the AR 1 or AR 2 surplus processes investigated above, though they are natural examples and plausible descriptions of the uni¨ariate behavior of the U.S. real primary surplus, lead to a completely counterfactual description of the joint behavior of surplus and real debt. Simple AR surplus processes imply that the real value of the debt should be positively correlated with surpluses. In the data, as shown in Figure 2 , high surpluses are Ž . associated with declining real debt. Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba 1998 use Ž . these counterfactual predictions to reject the fiscal theory with an AR 1 surplus process.
To make this point precisely, denote the real value of the debt
Ž . The present value condition 4 says that the real value of the debtᎏof any maturity structure ᎏis equal to the present value of real surpluses:
Ž . With an AR 1 surplus, s s s q , the surplus and real value of debt are t t y1 t perfectly positively correlated:
This result holds for any debt policy, including the active debt policy analyzed above. More generally, any time series process in which the present value on the Ž . right-hand side of 40 moves positively with the series itself predicts that surpluses should be positively correlated with debt. Therefore, to describe plausibly the joint behavior of the surplus and real debt ᎏthe fact that real debt declines when surpluses are highᎏthe surplus must follow a process whose level is negatively correlated with its long-run and present values. This statement has nothing to do with the fiscal theory, since Ž . equation 40 is entirely in real terms and holds in all models, fiscal or not.
On first glance processes with negative long-run responses seem strange. On second glance they suggest that surpluses respond to real debt values, the ''Ricardian regime'' or ''passive'' special case that invalidates the fiscal theory. But on third glance such processes are a natural outcome of a debt policy run to smooth inflation in the face of transitory surplus shocks.
In a recession, the government must finance a deficitᎏa negative shock to s . value of outstanding debt. 2. As discussed above, if long-term debt is outstanding, the government can sell additional long-term debt with no change in future surpluses; this action devalues outstanding long-term debt, causing future rather than current inflation.
3. The government can sell additional debt, while promising to increase future Ž . surpluses. For example, with one-period debt, an increase in debt sales B tq 1 t while holding future surpluses s constant results in an equiproportionate tq1 increase in the future price level p and hence does not raise any revenue or tq1 affect prices at time t. But if the government can promise to raise future Ž . surpluses, then it can sell more debt B tq 1 with no effect on p ; hence it
can raise more revenue without inflating away existing debt. In this last example a negative surplus shock today is followed by an increased surplus in the future. The first two options lead to large swings in inflation. The third strategy leads to much less volatile inflation. Hence, we expect a government that wishes to smooth inflation to follow something like the third strategy. And in fact we routinely think of governments offsetting current fiscal stringency by borrowing, and implicitly or explicitly promising to raise future taxes or cut future spending to pay off the resulting debt. If they did not do so, the total real value of the debt would not rise when governments issue extra nominal debt. Thus, we routinely think of surplus processes, which, under partial government control, have response functions that reverse sign after a shock.
The first two options also lead to real values of the debt that are positively correlated with the surplus. The fact that high surpluses seem to pay down the real value of the debt is not an accounting identity; it results from the government's choice to do so rather than to finance deficits by inflating away the value of outstanding debt.
A Model of Optimal Fiscal Policy
Here, I pursue a model that captures the intuition of the last few paragraphs. First, we must describe the surplus process. There is a cyclical component to the surplus that is by and large beyond the government's control. In a recession, lower income means less tax revenue, and entitlement and other program-based spending automatically rises. Denote this cyclical portion of the surplus Ž . 42 c s c q .
The government does control a long-term component of the surplus. By changing tax rates and the terms of government programs, it alters the overall level of the surplus. For good optimal-taxation reasons it does not change tax rates and spending policies to offset the transitory, cyclically-induced component of the surplus, for example raising tax rates in recessions and lowering them in booms. Let the controllable component of the surplus follow a random walk,
The actual surplus is the sum of the two components,
ŽThe random walk is a convenient simplification. The model works in much the same way if z follows any process z s z q that is more persistent than t t t y1 t . c , 4 so that z controls the long-run surplus.
t t
Next, we must state the government's problem. The government picks the change in the controllable component of the surplus at each date. must be t t in the time-t information set, and it must not be predictable from time t y 1 information. The government also picks nominal debt B in the time t informat tion set, and the steady state maturity structure . The government picks Ä 4 Ä 4 , , B to minimize the variance of inflation, given that the price level is t t Ž . determined by 19 , which specializes given this surplus structure to
Now we can study solutions to this problem. There are policies that set the Ž variance of inflation to zero. The government may choose arbitrarily the . optimal policy is not unique and then chooses debt and the long-run component of the surplus according to
sy .
Ž .
To check this solution, plug these choices into 44 and verify that each power of L on the right-hand side is equal to zero.
Character of the Solution
I compare the time-series process predicted by the inflation-minimization problem with actual time series in two ways, by comparing graphs of artificial with real data, and by comparing the predicted time-series processes with estimates of actual time-series processes.
Ž . Analytically, we can see from 46 that shocks to the long-run surplus are negatively correlated with shocks to the transitory component of the surplus. As expected, the government meets a short-run negative surplus shock by raising surpluses in the long-run.
A Graph of Artificial Data
Figures 8 and 9 plot simulated time series from the optimal policy system. The parameters are s 0.6 and ␦ s 0.95. The pictures are identical for any value of w . g 0, 1r␦ . The random number draw is the same across the two pictures. In Figure 8 we see how the surplus is generated from its permanent and transitory components. There are periodic recessions, in which the transitory component of the surplus declines, and booms in which it rises. The government slightly raises the permanent component of the surplus in the recessions and lowers it in the booms. This change has little effect on the short-run properties of the surplus, since the actual surplus tracks the transitory component closely. But it has a dramatic effect on the long-run or present value properties of the surplus. The long-run surplus rises in recessions so the government can raise revenue by selling debt, and it falls in booms as the government pays off debt. Figure 9 presents the joint properties of the total surplus, debt and debt growth. Comparing Figure 9 to actual data in Figure 2 we notice the similarity. Debt is not well correlated with the surplus, and it wanders at much lower frequency than the surplus; growth in debt is nicely negatively correlated with the surplus. The simple model thus accounts for the initially puzzling time-series Ž . behavior of debt and surplus, and shows why despite a simple AR 1 input, the result is far from the perfect positive correlation of debt and surplus that a pure Ž . AR 1 surplus process predicts.
ŽSince the quantities B, s denote proportional deviations from steady state, Figure 9 presents
This transformation converts the debt series to the same unitsᎏreal and relative to the surplus steady stateᎏas the surplus series. This transformation also completely removes from the time-series properties of B , s in this t t example. Since the price level is constant, there is no distinction between real . and nominal debt in the simulated data.
Time Series Processes
For a slightly more formal comparison of model and data, we can compare the time-series process of debt and surplus predicted by the simple model to those we can estimate in the data. Debt and surplus in the model follow the joint time series process 
Debt Process
Ž . Table I presents regression estimates of the total debt process 47 , using data Ž described in the Introduction. Since the model has no growth and no inflation, the table runs the regression using the ratio of total real Federal debt to . Ž . consumption. The table verifies that an AR 2 with one root near unity and one root around 0.5 is an excellent fit to this process.
Debt-surplus Relation
Ž .
Equation 49 is consistent with the finding in the data that the surplus is strongly negatively correlated with changes in the total value of the debt, and Ž . given the debt process 47 , poorly correlated with the level of the total value of the debt. To quantify this relation, Table II presents a regression of surplus on debt.
The relative values of the coefficients on current and lagged debt conform to Ž . the prediction of 49 . The absolute values are about a half too small. There is of where r is the gross ex-post real return on the government bond portfolio less t the consumption growth rate. Therefore, the error term in the regression is largely the real return on government bonds. That return was low in the first Ž . half of the sample, when the surplus and right-hand side of 49 was high, and Ž . high in the latter part of the sample when the surplus and right-hand side of 49 was low. There is a decade-long movement in the error term, correlated with the right-hand variable. This fact lowers both coefficients but does not affect their relative values.
Surplus Process
Ž .
The surplusrconsumption ratio is well-modeled as an AR 1 , or at most an Ž . AR 2 . Figure 10 contrasts the univariate response to and multivariate response . to response functions predicted by the model. The univariate response Ž . function is very close to an AR 1 : I use ␦ s 0.95 so the unit root on the left-hand side nearly cancels the moving average root on the right-hand side, Ž . leaving only the autoregressive root 1 y L . At long horizons, the univariate Ž . Ž . response function stops decaying at a positive value 1 y ␦ r 1 y s 0.125 so it Ž . is in fact even more persistent than an AR 1 . A researcher examining the Ž . univariate properties of s from this model would undoubtedly stop at an AR 1 ; t most diagnostics are not capable of noticing the long-run divergence from an Ž . AR 1 implied by the near-canceling of roots. Thus, the univariate surplus process is broadly consistent with the data. 
To find the univariate representation, write the spectral density of 48
␦ -1 and -1, so this corresponds to the Wold representation.
A Subtle Trap for Empiricists
Figure 10 reminds us of a subtle trap for empiricists. What could be more natural in evaluating the fiscal theory than to fit a surplus process, take its expected present value, and then test whether the real value of the debt does indeed correspond to the estimated present value of the surplus? A reader of Ž . Hansen, Roberds, and Sargent 1991 already knows that one cannot follow this procedure; present values in such a test must be calculated from the joint debt-surplus process, because the univariate surplus model cannot reveal agents' Ž . information sets. Furthermore, we have already seen in 50 that the shock to agents' information sets cannot be recovered from current and past surpluses. Figure 10 shows what will go wrong if we try to take present values using the univariate process: The univariate response is always positive, while the true response function to shocks to agents' information is eventually negative. Thus ''present values'' calculated from responses to the univariate shock move positively with the surplus itself, while the true present value moves negatively with surpluses.
To give a better feel for this problem, Figure 11 plots simulated surplus time series together with the true simulated value of the debt, the value predicted by Ž . an AR 1 and the value predicted from the correct univariate process. The true value of the debt is equal to the true present value of the surplus,¨s t As the graph shows, this calculation predicts a value of the debt that is perfectly correlated with the surplus, and nothing at all like the true value of the debt. 
Ž .
The univariate debt prediction uses the true univariate surplus process 50 Ž . rather than the AR 1 approximation to calculate the present value of the surplus:
This prediction for the value of the debt is again positively correlated with the surplus and has no resemblance to the true debt process.
In sum, a researcher who fit a univariate surplus model and compared its present value to the value of the debt, using data from this artificial economy, Ž . would reject the present value condition. He would most likely fit an AR 1 surplus process, coming to the dramatically counterfactual prediction that debt and surplus should be perfectly correlated. With a lot of data and memories of the unit root debates he might fit the correct univariate process, but he would still come to a dramatically counterfactual prediction for debt. As in the analysis Ž . of Hansen, Roberds, and Sargent 1991 , the only way to fit correctly the debt-surplus process in such a way that the value of debt equals the present Ž value of surpluses is to estimate the joint debt-surplus process. And even this procedure does not test the fiscal theory, since the present value condition holds . in both ''Ricardian'' and ''non-Ricardian'' regimes, but that's a separate point.
CONCLUSION
I started by analyzing the comparative statics of the fiscal theoryᎏthe effect of changing surpluses with the debt held constant, and the effect of changing debt with the surplus held constantᎏwhile allowing for long-term debt. These comparative statics are quite different from the standard case with only short-7 Ž . To derive this formula, express the surplus as a sum of two AR 1 components, driven by the shocks , Then, I considered the question of optimal debt and surplus policy in pursuit of stable inflation. I found that long-term debt can be useful when the present value of surpluses varies by more than surpluses themselves. Perhaps more importantly, long-term debt allows the government to offset surplus shocks as they come. In this case, and especially when the government can choose the long-term surplus as well, the optimal policy produces artificial time series that display many initially puzzling properties of actual time series.
The optimal policies that I study here do not perfectly describe U.S. time series. Their primary failing is that they are too successful: they produce less variation of inflation than we observe. In addition, the nature of the optimization problems and the approximate solution conspired so I could not say much about the optimal maturity structure and especially about optimal state-contingent variation in the optimal maturity structure.
One can follow two paths in response to this criticism, both with long histories in the optimal monetary policy literature. Either the problem is harder than the model specifies, or inflation was simply a mistake.
The first path suggests that we add further complications to the models, so that optimal policy produces greater variation in inflation and the maturity choice is not degenerate. Most obviously, one could add price stickiness or some other friction. Such frictions would revive the inflation-output trade-offs that were a central part of classical monetary policy analyses such as Sargent and Ž . Wallace 1975 , and they would generate an explicit welfare maximization Ž . problem in the modern general equilibrium tradition. Woodford 1998a has analyzed fiscal models with such frictions, and the optimal policy exercises are waiting to be solved. In addition, one could use the exact solution rather than the approximate solutions; this path could generate more interesting results at a large cost in computational complexity. For example, in the approximate solu- general solution, deliberate state-contingent lengthening and shortening of the maturity structure can affect the time-series process of inflation. Most importantly, the component of the surplus under the government's control should be modeled as the result of distorting taxes, following the theory Ž of dynamic optimal distortionary taxation for example, Chari, Christiano, and Ž . Ž .. Kehoe 1994 , and Stokey 1983 . Inflation is a state-contingent default, and perhaps this theory can shed light on why it is chosen. While such a state-contingent default in response to the low productivity and low surplus growth of the 70's may be fairly easy to generate, it will be harder to generate the cyclical state-contingent default in booms, when inflation is greatest, rather than busts, when it is lowest. Also, since ex-post devaluations are so useful in smoothing inflation, the time-consistency issues mentioned in the introduction will be important.
Alternatively, perhaps inflation was simply a mistake and we should advocate better policy, as monetarists charged for years that fluctuating inflation was due to mistakes by the Fed and k-percent or other rules would produce less volatile inflation. However, to make sense of the data, I had to assume that the government already does a great deal of inflation smoothing, aggressively using active fiscal policy to offset cyclical surplus shocks. Therefore, a k-percent debt growth rule would result in much more inflation volatility than we observe. 8 Improvements will involve more subtle changes in the dynamic, state-contingent path of surpluses and debt.
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Debt Policy
Next, we need to characterize the debt policy that supports the desired price level. We can simply Ž . state the policy by solving 33 for debt,
It is useful to also express B in terms of the history of p, s, or . Usingt
we can express the first term as 
Ž . Ž . y1 Ž . Ž . With an AR 1 surplus, L s 1 y L , equation 59 reduces to 39 presented in the text.
Ž . Using 58 to eliminate in favor of p, and collecting terms, we have a characterization in terms of the present value of s and past p:
at time 0 and Ž . This is the price solution 12 . The last equality defines W . We can find a more direct definition
